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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to determine if US Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units posi-
tioned in a belt defense perform better than- the point defense that the US Army cur-
rently uses. It doeszthis through a comparison of three ADA defense strategies:
1. Forward Concentration (belt defense)
2. Balanced Concentration (point defense)
3. Rear Area Concentration (point defense)
The Joint Theater Level Simulation, a -computer combat simulation model, is used as a
tool for analysis to compare the three strategies in a Fulda Gap scenario against a vari-
ety of Soviet attack options. The JTLS model is used because of its ability to simulate
large forces and also to demonstrate the value of JTLS as an analytical tool, in addition
to a training and evaluation tool. Using the following measures of effectiveness: Soviet
airplanes shot down b3 US ADA, percentage of successful Soviet bombing missions, and
number of US ground-targets destroyed, the forward concentration defense proves to
ha'e a significant advantage oxer the other two strategies, regardless of the weighting
of the measures of eflfectiveness.
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The mission of the United States Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) is:
To nullifv or reduce the effectiveness of attack or surveillance by hostile aircraft or
missiles after they are airborne .... [Ref 1: p. 1-11
or, more succinctly, to shoot down enemy airplanes.
Where should ground-based ADA units be positioned to best accomplish this
mission? The US Army has answered this question by placing ADA units under the
command of brigade and larger-sized combat units. The combat unit commander des-
ignates and prioritizes specific assets to be protected and the ADA units are positioned
to protect the assets [Ref. 2: p. 521. In this type of ADA defense, called point defense
[Ref 1: p. 4-51. there are often not enough ADA units to adequately protect all the assets
a commander desires. An eneni aircraft could be flying around in his opponents rear
area and, as long as it avoids those assets that are protected, it could escape being fired
upon.l
In contrast to the characteristics of a point defense, a belt defense utilizes ADA
units in a -... linear configuration to provide early attrition of the enemy as he attempts
penetration to rear areas." [Ref. : p. 4-5] A belt defense is much like an invisible wall
on the battlefield, and anx ageressor who attempts to pass through the wall will be fired
upon. Although a belt defense is impractical. indeed undefined for battalion. brigade.
and division-sized fronts. it can be used for corps and larger size fronts. Belt defenses
are criticized because thex use a large amount of ADA resources and few commanders
want an ADA unit protecting an open gap containing no assets when it could be pro-
viding increased coverage to one of their high-priority assets. Also, some belt defenses
can be defeated by flying around either end [Ref 1: p. 4-51.
If a belt defense were constructed in such a way that these criticisms were invalid,
would it provide a better defense than the point defense currently in use? This thesis
ceks to answer this question in the limited context of a conventional war in Central
Europe against Soviet forces.
lI Thi presupposes that the opponent's air force does not send an interceptor tip ater it.
B. FORMULATION OF PROBLEM
I. Means of-Comparing Strategies
In order to compare strategies, such as what type of ADA defense to use, a
means of comparison must be established. The ultimate means of comparison to use-for
this problem is to analyze the data from a real -war, or several wars. Unless there exists
an historical record of wars-which includes data upon which a comparison can be made,
the use of real war as a means of comparing strategies is infeasible. Another means of
comparison is through the use of a militar, exercise. This method is appealing because
numerous variables that might otherwise affect the results can be held constant.
A different means of comparing strategies, and the one that will be used in this
thesis, is to use a computer model to-simulate war. There are several aJvantages gained
by using a computer model as a means of comparing strategies:
* A great degree of control can be obtained using a computer model; it allows the
researcher to isolate variables of interest.
* It allows the analyst control over the amoullt and type of data to be collected.
* Using a computer model allows %erification of results, due to the abilit to replicate
the model.
* Lastly, and perhaps the most important, is the ability for one person to use a
computer model to simulate dozens of wars in a short amount of time for relati eih
little expense.
It is for these reasons that the means of comparison for ADA defense strategies in this
thesis is a computer model of war.
2. Choosing a War
What war should be simulated on the computer? The answer to this question
should be based primarily on the ADA strategies to be compared. First, the war should
not be a contri ed. fictitious, 'sterile" war; it should be fought in a specific. reasonable
location against an identified foe. The fea ibiiit% and realness of a computer simulated
war gives a measure of credence and %alidit, to the results that cannot be obtained by
a contrived war. Second, the war needs to be one in which each type of ADA defense
stratcg' could be feasibly used. It would make little sense to compare point defense to
belt defense in a %ar in which no commander would even consider using a belt defense.
One war scenario which meets the above prerequisites is- the Fulda Gap scenario.
The Fulda Gap is a 70 kilometer wide salient that lies along the border contig-
uous to E. Germany and W. Germany near the W. German town of Fulda (see
Figure I on page 3). This gap has historicall% been the route of choice for inasion into
Germany and FraInce, al.d it mIi~l1E well be the choice of Warsaw Pact forces tRcf. 3: p.
1 24]. TVhe modern l-ulda Gap scenario is a well-kniown scenario among military
modelers. It pits US (or NATO) forces against Soviet (,r W~arsaw Pact) forces in the
Fuilda Gap. This scenario is excellent for purposes- of comp.tring AIDA strategies. 11he
Soviet Union possesses a large niumber of advanced fighter a-id bomber aircraft and is
perhaps our most formidablc foe. An air attack From Soviet foio~s would be a genuine
test of US Army ADA strategies.
Figure 1. Map of Europe shtoiiitg location of Fulda Gap
InI lipht of recent events concerning the reunification of Germam. it could be
argued that the rulda Gap scenario is no longer a walid option for potEn1tiA COnfliLt.
The following rosponscc are offiercd:
1. Notwirlistazdin- the reunificationi or Germian%, hitory has sliom n the 1-tida Gap
to I-c a likxh, routc of i'asion. independent ofunhethcr thle voixrnient conrolinz
it was frienidly or bd1igcrent.
2It i lnt wise to thlow avay war pl.-ns or discount possibWsceain%.a*lr over
three dccadvs of a iiaystnoiru to hecnsooeortova.
3. For comparing ADA strategies, the actual location of the war or the name of the
opponent is-not as important as the number and type of aircraft that are-attacking.
The actual business of air defense, after all, takes-place several thousand -feet abo e
the ground.
3. Structure of Problem
The thesis problem of comparing ADA strategies is structured as a-comparison
of three different defenses: -balanced, forward concentration, and rear area concen-
tration.
a. Balanced Defense
The balanced defense is the -name given to the -air defense strategy that the








Figure 2. Balanced Defense
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In the figure, the dark lines running across the top and bottom of the figure
indicate a battle sector, or boundary. The line running between the two circles labeled
FEBA is the Forward Edge of the Battle Area, or the dividing line between-the friendly
and enemy ground combat units. The term ASSET is used to depict resources that the
commander wants protected from an-enemy air attack. These assets could be maneuver
units, support units, headquarters, fuel depots, or nuclear storage sites. The shaded
circles enclosing some of the assets indicate the engagement envelope, or coverage pro-
vided by ADA units. Enemy aircraft would attack from right to left; if they fly into a
shaded area they face a high probability of being fired upon. Notice that some of the
assets are not covered. This is one of the consequences of having limited ADA re-
sources.
b. Forward Concentrated Defense
The second strategy being analyzed in this thesis is the forward concen-





Figure 3. Forward Concentrated Defense
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In this figure, the concept of belt defense is easily demonstrated. There are
the same -number of ADA units as shown in Figure 2 on page 4, but the majority of the
units are concentrated near the FEBA. This creates a 'belt' of ADA coverage that an
enemy plane must fly through- in order to reach an asset. The advantage is that all of
the assets are indirectly protected. The main criticism of the belt defense (that they can
be defeated by flying--around either end) can now be addressed. Imagine that -the battle
sectors above and below the one in Figure 3 also use a forward concentrated defense
and that this goes on until- such a location -that there is-no threat of an air attack. Ob-
viously, the forward concentrated defense would not be viable on a small front such as
Panama, or when invading the shores of enemy territory by sea; but, if effective. it could
be used on a large land mass when the battle front is several hundred miles wide.
-c. Rear Area Concentrated Defense
The third, and final -strategy to be analyzed and compared is the rear area
concentrated defense. In this defense, a point defense is used; however, the ADA units
are predominantly located around assets well away from the FEBA. As shown in
Figure 4 on page 7, this type of strategy looks very risky; the front-line assets are pro-
vided only minimum protection. This type of defense might -be feasible if the rear area
assets were of such vital importance that the additional coverage was justified. Justifia-
ble situations could include a nuclear stockpile that a nation was preparing to use, or
perhaps a nation defending a major metropolitan area, its own capitol, or strategic oil
processing sites. In any case the rear area defense provides a strategy that should per-
form well against an air attack into the rear area.
C. DESIRED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Before deciding which particular computer simulation will be used to model the
problem, measures of effectiveness (MOEs) should be discussed. Measures of effective-
ness are quantitative values that allow model results to be evaluated to answer specific
questions. In this thesis, MOEs will provide measures by which the three ADA defense
strategies can be compared. As an air defender, the ultimate measure of success is to
be able to answer "yes" to the following question: Did-I adequately protect those assets
that the ground forces commander wanted me to protect, thereby enabling him to ac-
complish his mission? There are, however, various degrees of success which can be








Figure 4. Rear Area Concentrated Defense
* Number of successful enemy air attacks.
s Amount of damage inflicted by enemy air attacks.
a Number of enemy planes shot down.
* Amount of damage sustained by ADA units.
9 Amount of missiles/azmnunition expended by ADA units.
1. Number of Successfl Enemy Air Attacks
Using the number of successful enemy air attacks as an MOE captures the ex-
tent to which the enemy has air superiorit,,. For purposes of this thesis, a successful air
attack is achieved when an enemy aircraft releases his ordnance on an assigned target.
If the number of air attacks varies dail,,, the percentage of successful enemy air attacks
is a more useful figure. If the percentage is high, it means that either the enemy is at-
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tacking priorities that are not covered- by ADA, or that the ADA coverage is not -very
effective.
2. Amount of Damage Inflicted by Enemy Air Attacks
This MOE is a more direct measurement of the cffects-of enemy air attacks, al-
though it is much more difficult -to quantify. Some sort of value must -be -agreed upon
and placed on various kinds of personnel and equipment. Although this MOE and the
previous one may appear to measure the same thing, a subtle difference exists. The en-
emy could have a high percentage of successful air attacks, but -they could be inflicting
minimum damage because they were bombing something which had a Ner low value,
or because their ordnance-was not very accurate or lethal.
3. Number of Enemy Planes Shot Down
This MOE is the all-time favorite, number one MOE for air defenders because once an
enemy plane goes down in flames, it is virtually impossible for it to come back and at-
tack in the future. Although the utility of this MOE can be questioned for a one-day
war or for kamikaze air attacks by religious zealots, it is an excellent MOE for use in
any scenario in v hich an, aircraft is expected to make more than one attack. Once
again, if the number of air attacks varies from day to day. this MOE would best be ex-
pressed as a percentage of planes launched or planes in inventory.
4. Amount of-Damage Sustained by ADA Units
The amount of damage sustained by friendly ADA units is the polar opposite of the
numbei of planes shot down. As ADA units are a major hurdle in the enem} 's quest for
a successful air attatck, the enemy goes to great lengths to neutralize and destroy ADA
sites. Their efforts range from air-to-surface missiles that home in on the ADA units
radar signals, to air attacks designed specifically to locate and destroy ADA units (wild
weasel missionis). While an ADA unit is expected to repel enemy air attacks, it is also
expected to survive so it can repel attacks the next day.
5. Amount of Missiles/Ammunition Expendedby ADA Units
This MOE is meant to capture those ADA units that may not be damaged, but
are unable to -perform their mission due to a lack of missiles or ammunition. An ADA
unit is expected to use its missiles efficiently. Possibly the most efficient -use of a missile
is to destroy a formation of attacking aircraft before they release their ordnance. In
concert with the other MOEs, this MOE can measure efficiency. It can-also be used to
analyze and compare the strategies from a logistical point of view.
II. THE MODEL
A. SELECTING AN APPROPIATE MODEL
Because the battle scenario and the desired measures of effectiveness have already
been determined, the-process of selecting a particular computer simulation model with
which to conduct the comparison of ADA strategies has been made easier. One model
which seemed well-suited for this thesis is the Joint Theater-Level Simulation (JTLS).
Described in detail later in this-chapter, JTLS -has one overwhelming advantage -over all
other computer simulation models similarly -equipped: availability. JTLS is readily
available for use-in the Navy Warganling Laboratory at the Naval Postgraduate-School.
Additionally, technical consultation was a~ailable from Edward P. Kelleher, an anal~st
and prograinmier who has had -extensive experience with the 6esign, programming and
use of the JTLS model. This factor-made the JTLS model particularly attractive for-use
in this thesis.
B. JTLS BACKGROUND
JTLS is a computer-assisted simulation that models two-sided air, ground, and-naval
combat with logistical and intelligence support. It is designed as a theater-le-,el model
for use in the followine areas:
1. The analysis, development, and evaluation of contingency plans and joint tactics.
2. The evaluation of alternative military strategies.
3. The analysis of combat systems.
The first JTLS model became operational in September, 1983. Now in its ninth release
(Version 1.65C), JTLS is owned by the Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment
Directorate (-8) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Warfare Center at Hlurlburt
Field, FL has MAPP (Modern Aids-to Planning Program) component project responsi-
bility for JTLS, and the configuration management agency is the Joint Data- Systems
Support Center of the Defense Communications Agency. [Ref. 4: p. 2-1, Ref. 51
In addition to its use at the Naval Postgraduate School, JTLS is used at the fol-
lowing locations: I-Q US Atlantic Command, IIQ US Special Operations Command,
Marine Corps Wargaming & Assessment Center, National Defense University, I-IQ Re-
public of Korea-US Combined Forces Command, HQ US Central Connand, IJQ US
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European Command, I-IQ US Southern Command, Joint Warfare -Center, and the US
Army War College. [Ref. 5]
C. JTLS DESCRIPTION
1. System Support Hardware
JTLS is designed to-run on VAX computers -running the VMS operating system.
To run JTLS with a reasonable execution time, the VAX computer xniust have a. least
eight- milionb tes of main- memory, and apprz)ximatel 500 million b- tes of disk storage.
Additionally, at least four DEC VTI00-compatible -terminals are reqaired. In its maxi-
mum configuration, 26 such terminals are -used. A graphics suite allows viewing -unit
locations, unit characteristics, along -with terrain characteristics before aiid-during JTLS
execution. [Ref. 6: p. 4-1]
. JTLS Software
Most of the JTLS source code is written in the SIMSCRIPT 11.5 computer
language. The "'C" progranmming language, devcloped by Bell Laboratories, is used in
the dexelopment of JTLS databases and the grap',ics programs that drive the graphics
displays. A few subroutines in the graphics progam are written in FORTRAN. [Ref
6: p. 4-3]
3. JTLS Game Phases
In the JTLS System. the wargamring process is divided into four game phases:
initialization, preparation, execution, and anal) sis. Each game phase consists of one or
more programs or systems which allow user interfh'ce with the system.
a. Initialization
During the initialization phase, the Scenario Development System is used
to create a JTLS databa.e, a very time-consuming and extensive task. The JTLS d ° t-
base is divided into two pal -s: the terrain-file and- the scenario data file. The terrain file
contains an exhaustive amount of data relating to-th- : _' ,. i cn which the game is-held.
The European database, used for this thesis, cc, uns over 8O,000 coded terrain
hexagons. Each JTLS hexagon represents an imag~nary hexagon on land measuring 16.5
kilometers from side to side. A hexagon is coded with elevation and one of 15 possible
terrain types. Some of the additiond data associated with a hexagon include the barriers
and target -types located within the hexagon. 1"he scenario -data file contains the fol-
lowing types of data:
1. Genemal modeling parameters that affect the mathematical and logical algorithms
used to model the operations of theater level military forces.
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2. Unit and unit force structure data. such as-organizational structure, assigned com-
bat and combat support equipment, ordnance, and logistics.
3. Target data that describe militarily significant objects that can interact with a mil-
itary unit as it conducts its combat operations, such as-bridges and runways.
Due to the popularity of the Fulda Gap-sf , among military modelers, the creation
o' a scenario data file for this thesis wa -.,,, vsier than it could have been, in that a
scenario with US and Soviet forcec ,. .'- 1 1 c ? ton Scenario' alread'. =existed in the
JTLS directory. Minor modifications, s,.]i as unit location and certdin modeling pa-
rameters were made to the 'Patton Scenar:,. dt'- -file and it was used for the compar-
ative analysis. [Ref. 6: pp. 2-1 - 2-4]
b. Preparation
The preparation phase uses the JTLS Executive System. The JTLS Technical Coordi
nator uses this system to start and rebtart the game,-configure the exercises, and manage
the directories ,<eneral housekeeping of files, ,..id making tape backups as -necessary;.
[Ref. 4: pp. 2-2]
c. Execution
During the execution phase of the game, The Conxi'at Events Program
(CEP) 'fig hts the war' while the Model Inteiface Program (MIP) allows tile Controller
and Game Players to interface with the CEP.
The CEP is the central -. -,am of the iTLS system, thl combat model. It deter-
mines all of the actions and interactions among the air, land, and naval forces de-
fined and modeled for the specific scenario being run. Tie CEP creates, maintains,
and reports the current status of the warfare environment being modeled. [Ref. 4:pp. 2--I]
Through the MI, "Players direct the forces under their command by creating and
sending orders to the CEI. The .MIP provides the players with a menu-driven environ-
ment fi'om which these orders can be created and sent." [Ref. 4: pp. 2-4
d. Analysis
The analysis phase of the JTLS game uses the ITLS Postprocessor System
to aggregate information on game results and to produce reports, charts, and graphs.
The Postprocessor System is curtntly undergoing a major redesign -effort and was not
used -with this thesis due to incomplete postprocessor files in version 1.651. o"JT_S (Ref.
4: pp. 2-6b]. The data for 'postprocessing-by-han-d" was obtained through periodic
summary reports generatcd by the Combat Events Program.
I!
4. JTLS-Staff'iag
Five difilrent types of staff positions are required in order to run the JTLS
mudel:
I. Director--Plans and administers the wargame.
2. Technical Coordinator--Starts a--d restarts the game, and-r ::vices -computer ex-
pertise to tie game control staff
3. S xstem Manager--Configures the computer system in -preparation fc- the installa-
tion of the JTLS model.
4. Controller--The game monitor. He -has the capability to stop -the game, change
game-parameters, take checkpoints, and alter the game speed.
5. Plavers- IRED and BLUE. Have command-of forces on th,.-r respective side. !Ref
6: pp. 2-5]
Due to the individualized, and independent nature of thesis research, t1 author learned
how to perform, and then subsequently performed all -of the functions, except for num-
ber three, hinself. The System Manager function was not needed, as the--computer in





A major part of the JTLS exercise design has already been determined by
choosing the three different ADA strategi,, to be compared. What about the makeup
of the opposing-(Soviet) air force? In the Patton -scenario of-the JTLS model, the Soviet
air force in the Fulda Gap consists of 202 airplanes divided-among three airbabes. Al-
though it is agreed that sending all 202 airplanes to attack at one-time or in-one day is
not a wise strategy, a sufficient number of airplanes need to attack in order to fully tax
the US air defenses. The number of airplanes that was decided upon was 174, or ap-
-proximately 86% of 202. To enal-'.e-the comparison of ADA defense stratgies to be ro-
bust with respect to Soviet attac'k s..ategies, two exercise design variables- were
introduced:
I. Location of Attack -- This variable can be one of two variants. The Soviet air-
planes-can attack targets along the f Z1A (ground troops and equipment), or they
can attack targets in the rear area (airbases).
2. Air Raid Mission Size -- The Soxiets can attack with a few missions consisting of
a large number of airplanes, or they can attack-with many maissions consisting of
a small number of aircraft.
Ior the second desigEi variable. although the-number of planes in a-mission changes, the
total number of planes that attack in one day remains con.tan, as does the total number
of planes that actually conduct the bombing. The factor that is different between the
missions is the size of the escort force. The escort force for a bombing mission generally
consists oP
I. Air-to-air fighters, whose job it is to eliminate the opposing force interceptors sent
to shoot down the bomber's.
2. Janmmers, who disrupt the opposing forces air defense radars by electronic and
other means.
3. Wild Weasels, which take a more direct approacn- dian the jammers by attacking
air defense sites with ordnance.
The So ict cormmander can have either a large escort force, thereby increasing the
probability or a successful bombing attack but decreasing the the number of targets
bombcd, or he can ha% - a small escort force with which he can attack many targets, but
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at a greater risk. Because the size of the escort force is the determining factor in-the air
raid mission size, the second exercise-design variable will be called 'escort size.' The three
independent exercise design variables (ADA defense strategy, Location of Attack, and
Escort Size) interact to form 12 combinations. A visual representation of these combi-
nations is displax ed as a three-dimensional scenario design matrix in Figure 5 on page
15. In the figure, each combination-is represented by a block, or cell. Each cell corre-
sponds to a unique scenario that must be programmed into the JTLS model, run and
analyzed. The-cell that is shaded represents a forward concentration ADA defense fac-
ing a rear area Soviet attack with a large escort size. The design-matrix shows the range
over which the three ADA strategies will be compared. A strategy which works well
with one of the 'columns' of the matrix may not be the best choice for another.
2. Available MOEs
To determine which ADA strategy is the best choice given the So~iet attack options,
MOEs will be used. Three of the five MOEs discussed in "C. DESIRED MEASURES
OF EFFECTIVENESS" on page 6 will be used.
a. Number of Enemi' Planes Shot Down
This MOE will be referred to as MOE 'N 1: Soviet Airplanes Shot Down by
US ADA. This information is readily available from the JTLS Periodic Summary Re-
port which lists the number and type of planes shot down by ADA. Information on
which ADA unit shot the plane down is not available.
b. Ntumber o Successful Enenv Air Attacks
Further defined as MOE #2 (Percentage of Successful Soviet Bombing
Missions) this MOE is available from JTLS as the number of aircraft that delivered
weapons. In JTLS, an aircraft deli ers its weapons if it finds a predetermined target type
along its designated bombing route. To prevent the act of finding a target from be-
coming a source of %ariation, each bombing mission was gixen exact information on the
location of its target. Thus, ifan aircraft -reached its target, it delivered its-weapons.
c. Aniottnt of Damage lInlicted by Enemy Air Attacks
This information is captured in MOE #3: Number of US Ground-Targets
Destroyed. In the JTLS rear area scenario the assets that are attacked are the US
airbases at Koblenz, Frankfurt, and Kaiserslautern. The target types that are designated
are US airplanes. Because JTLS records the number of airplanes lost on the ground due
to air attack, this is a feasible MOE. For personnel, tanks, and lightly armored vehicles












F-igure 5. niree-Dimensional Scenario Design Matrix
nor is it easily available by modifying the model code. I-or this reason, NMOI 113 will be
dcfined only for attacks on the rear arca.
(I. AImoun~t of Damage Sustained ki ADAi Uunits
l3ccausc JTILS does not scparaLc the damage causcd by air attacks From
ground combat, data concerning this NNIlE are also not available. The actual results-of
the scenario runs were inivestigated, and the 'current, strenigth' of the ADA units at, the
end of' the day's attacks was alwvays above 95%, indicating that little or no 1xczmanent
damage was suIstained by AD)A units.
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e. Aniount of Missiles/Ammnwition Expended by ADA Units
This MOE is not extractable from the current version of JTLS. JTLS re-
cords the tonnage -of ammunition expended during a reporting period. This includes
ammunition from all weapons systems, incuding air defense systems. An unsuccessful
attempt " as made to modiy the code to separate the ADA ammunition from -the other
weapons systems. Future versions of JTLS are expected to-be able to report this MOE
as rounds, missiles fired by -individual ADA units.
3. Scenario Limitations
a. Logistics
The length of each scenario was kept to one- day because of the increased
complexit) of running the logistics functions in JTLS for wars in excess of one day.
Also, the lack of availability of logistical data and unit damage data for ADA units de-
creased the alue- of the benefits of running the scenarios for a longer period of time.
b. US Air Force
Although JTLS is normally run using the air forces of both sides, for a
'pure' analysis of ADA defense strategies the US Air Force was not played; except to
provide ground-targets for Soviet air attacks. Incorporating the air force into the sce-
narios would make the effort of programming the scenarios into the JTLS model ex-
treme!x difficult and time-consuming, and it would force the introduction of two or three
more independent % ariablcs. This could casil% increase the number of possible scenarios
to 36 or more, resulting in a programming and analysis effort be- ond that of this thesis
research.
c. Number of .ITLS Runs
Five runs were made for each of the twelve scenarios. This number allowed
for statistical testing of hypotheses at the a = 0.10 level while maintaining the time
spent executing the runs to a reasonable amount.
B. DESCRIPTION OF GROUND FORCES
The ground war was constructed to be as constant a factor as possible throughout
all scenarios. The beginning location and strength of every unit vas the same in every
scenario. Identical sets of orders were issued to the same units in each scenario. The
oni" thing that differed was the independent variable: the location of the ADA units.
The locations of the major US and Soviet combat units are shown on the map of
the rulda Gap area in Figure 6 on page 18. A more detailed list of units and locations
is contained in Appendix A. In the ground war, the 2d and 4th Armored Divisions are
16
ordered to conduct the main attack across the Fulda riher to capture the terrain cur-
rently held by the 12th Motorized Rifle Division. Tile Sth Infantry Division is ordered
to conduct a secondary attack in the south; thereby clashing with the 14th Motorized
Rifle Division and not allowine it to reinforce the defense-against the-main attack in the
north. The 9th Infantry Division is ordered to move into position behind the 8th
Infantry Division, and prepare to support either the main or secondary attack, as
needed. The Soviet 12th and 14th Motorized Rifle Divisions are ordered to defend in
place while the 10th Tank Division moves to reinforce tle defense against tile main at-
tack.
C. DESCRIPTION OF ADA UNITS
The locations_ ef ADA units in the forward concentration, balanced, and rear area
concentration defense scenarios are depicted in Figure 6 on page IS. Figure 7 on page
19, and Figure S on page 20, respectivel3. The units are represented bi engagement
envelope circles. A detailed list containing units and their exact locations in each of the
three types of defenses is contained in Appendix B.
D. DESCRIPTION OF AIR FORCES
1. Maxiinum Escort Raid
The maximum escort raids consist of nine bombing missions taking place over
a seven-hour neriod. Each bombing nission contains:
a twelve to fifteen bomber aircraft
* two electronic countermeasures (jammer) aircraft
* eight air defense suppression iwild wease!) aircraft
* five air-to-air fighter aircraft.
2. Miniimumn Escort Raid
There arc eighteen bombing missions in a minimum escort raid. The composi-
tion of a bombing mission is:
* four to five bomber aircraft
* one electronic countermeasures (jammer) aircraft
* two to three air defense suppression (wild weasel) aircraft
* two air-to-air fighter aircraft.
A detailed listing of maximum and minimnum escort attacks including composition. at-
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3. Attack Areas
The location of the aircraft silhouettes in Figure 9 on page 22 show the general locations
of a FEBA attack. Figure 10 on page 23 depicts the aircraft attacking the airbases in
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IV. MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The data produced by the sixty runs of the JTLS model were collected and- proc-
essed. The results and the analysis of the results are presented in terms of each MOE.
The tables containing the-results show the MOEs by run number for each of the twelve
scenarios. The sample mean and sample -standard deviation are also presented for each
scenario.
A. MOE #I: SOVIET AIRPLANES SHOT DOWN BY US ADA J
Table 1 shows the simulation results for MOE #1.
Table 1. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MOE #1: Soviet Airplanes Shot Down-
by US ADA
Type of Location of Escort Run Run -Run Run Run Sample Sample
ADA Defense Air Attack Size #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Mean Std. Dev.
Large 8 6 8 9 16 9.4 3.9
FEBA
Forward Small 45 51 46 38 46- 45.2 4.7
Concentration Large 108 93 125 101 105 106.4 11.8
Rear Area -
Small 148 152 153 151 147 150.2 2.6
Large 1 2 1 3 1 1.6 .89FEBA -
Balanced Small 1 4 4 3 1 2 1
Defense Large 73 72 65 72 67 69.8 3.6
Rear Area -
Small 134 118 138 124 130 128.8 8
Large 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FEBA
Rear Area Small 0 0 0 1 0 .2 .45
Concentration Large 61 55 61 66 74 63.4 7.1
Rear Area - - __Small 126 118 135 133 130 128.4 6.7
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1. Soviet attack upon the FEBA
When analyzing data, it is frequently helpiui -to start by using a graphical
method. A graph -can quickly convey insights that aj not readily available through a
table of data -(such- as Table 1). One type of graph which allows a quick comparison
of the ADA strategies through the MOE results is a-box plot. Box -plots -coney a -sense
of location and scale through which a comparison can be made. The box plots for the
results of a large and small escort attack on the FEBA are illustrated in Figure 11 and
Figure 12 on pages 25 and 26, respectively. Appendix D contains a-succinct explanation
of the symbols used in the box plots. It is quite apparent that-the forward concentration
defense does a much better job of shooting down aircraft than the other two--strategies.
One would have expect. ,- these results, due to the fact that the forward concentrated
defense has more ADA units in the area of attack -than the others. Still, some measure
of validation can be accrediled to a model that produces results -in line with intuiti e
thinking.








FORWARD BALANCED REAR AREA
CONCEhTRATION DEFENSE CONCENTRA iON
Figure II. Box Plot Showing M OE 1 Results for Large Escort Attack on FEBA
It is one thing to graphically show that the forward concentration defense is
better than the others; it is quite another to prove it statistically. In each scenario, an
MOE can be thought of as a random variable. A run of the scenario results in a real-
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ization -of that random N ari:ble, and each-random Nariable has an associated probabilki
density function. With such a small sample size (five runs) for each scenario, it would
be incorrect to assume that the -number of planes shot down 1ir -each strategy has a
normal distribution, or for that matter, -has any particular distribution.





FOFWARD BALAUCED REAR AREA
CONCENTRATION DEFENSE CONCENTRAION
Figure 12. Box Plot Showing MOE #1 Results for Sinall Escort Attack on FEBA
What is needed, then, is a nonparametric (distribution-free) test that detects
differences in location parameters. The M ann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, which is often
used for this purpose, assumes that the probability functions of the random variables
have identical variances [Ref, 7: p. 159]. Examination of the data-and the box plots show
that this assumption is not valid. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is a more general
nonparametric test that does not require the equality of variances assumption [Ref. 7:
p. 123]. It is also appropriate to use because the data is paired; the i, run of every sce-
nario uses Ole same random number seeds. The Wilcoxon signed lank test-uses the sign
and the magnitude of the difference between samples of two random variables to detect
a difference in the median of the random variables. As applied to MOE #1 for large
escort attacks on the FEBA, the corresponding hypotheses -for the Wilcoxon signed rank
test are:
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Null l-1ypotheis: There is no difference between a forward concentration and a bal-
anced defense as measured by the medians of the number of airplanes killed by each
strategy for a large escort attack on the FEBA.
Alternative: There is a differe:1 ze; the forward concentration kills more airplanes than
the balanced-defense.
and,
Null Hypothesis: There is -no difference between a'forward concentration and a rear
area concentration defense as measured by the medians of the number of airplanes
killed by each strategy for a large escort attack on the FEBA.
Alternative: There is a difference; the forward concentration kills more airplanes than
the rear area concentration-defense.
The level of statistical significance that will be used with this (and subseqent) applica-
tions of tile sign test is 0.= 0.10 i.e., the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is really true -is 0.10. When the Wilcoxon sign test is applied in this manner, the null
hypothesis is rejected in the two irifercnces above. 2 The forward concentration defense
produces the best results in terms of MOE #1.
2. Soviet attack u)on the Rear Area
The box plots for a large and small escort attack on the rear area are in
Figure 13 on page 28. The number of airplanes killed is a dramatic increase from those
resulting from attacks on the FEBA. This is probably because the airplanes have to fl
through more ADA coverage tc reach their targets in the rear. When attacks are made
along the FEBA, the airplane., aly have to fly through minimum coerage because the
ADA units are deployed at ;east 30 kilometers behind the FEBA (Nihere the assets are
located) due to tactical considerations. The ADA-co erage for the assets in the rear area
are able to deploy well fc -. ,-d of the asset, insuring increased time for airplanes to be
detected and engaged.
Although the forward concentration strategy appear to be better than the other
two strategies for both a large and small escort attack, the ditierence is not as pro-
nounced as that of an attack on the FEBA. When the Wilcoxon sign test procedures
are applied to these scenarios, the null hypothesis of equal medians of strategies is re-
jected. The conclusion is made that for Soviet attacks on the rear area, the forward
concetration defense is superior to the balanced or rear area concentration defense with
respect to MOE #1. Coupled with the results from Soviet attacks on the FEBA, if the
number of airplanes killed was the only consideration, the forward concentration defense
2 Appendix E contains details for the computation of the tebt statistic umcd in these hypothcses.
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STRATEGY COMPARISON FOR LARGE ESCORT ATTACK ON REAR AREA
I 0
z
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FO WARD BALANCED REAR AREA
CONCENTRATION DEFENSE CONCETRAON
Figure 13. Box Plot Showing MOE I1 Results'for Soviet Attack on Rear Area
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would be the strategy of choice for the US conunander, regardless of-the choice that-the
Soviet commander made. Figure 14 is a sk} scraper -plot that brings the twelve-scenarios
together for an overall comparison. The height of the skyscrapers are the-sample means
of the number of airplanes killed in each scenario. The dominance of the forward con-
centration strategy regardless of the Soviet attack options is very evident.
SKYSCRAPER PLOT OF MOE #1 SAMPLE MEANS
0
REMR BALANCED 0 WR
US DEFENSE OPTIONS
Figure 14. Overall Comparison of Options with MOE 11 Results
B. MOE 112: PERCENTAGE OF SUCCESSFUL SOVIET BOMBING MISSIONS
Table 2 on page 30 shows the simulation results for MOE #2. For this measure of
efiectiveness, lower percentages are better that higher ones. When examining Table 2,
notice the extremely high percentages for successful missions when the FEBA is at-
tacked. In view of the results from MOE :1, however, these high percentages should
be expected. The number of planes shot-down during FEBA attacks was very low. Also,
consider the fact that a plane can be shot down on a successful bombing mission as long
as it is shot down after it delivers its ordnance. This would account for the percentages
that still seem to be high even when factoring in the number of planes shot down.
The box plots for the scenario results in terms of MOE #2 are shown in Figure 15
on page 31, and Figure 16 on page 32. The plots display the high percentages for at-
tacks on the FEBA very effectively, The also show that the percent of successful
29
Table 2. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MOE 112: Percentage of Successful
Soviet Bombing Missions_____
Typ~e of Location-of Escort Run Run Run Run Run Sample Sample
ADA Defense Air Attack Size # 1 #r2 113 #q4 P#5 Mean JStd. Dev.
FB- Large 95196 99 99 92 96.2 j2.9
Forwsard Small 78 77' 79 85 85 80.8 3.9
Concenratia Large 43 I51 33 43 42 42.4 . 6.4
RerAra Small -1 12) 14 I20 16.4j 3.
Large 99 100 100 -100 100 9. 4
FEBA- _
Balanced ______Small 100 96 91 96 99 _96.4 3.5
Defense RrAra Large 5 6 49 60 48 56 53.8 5. 1
Small- 33 35 27 122 36 30.6 5.9
FEBA LreJ10 00 100 Jj00J1i0j 100 0
Rear Area ______jSmall 100 96 92 100- 100 97.6 3.6
Concentration Rear Are 69__ 64 61 ; 1 5.9__
Rear__Area__ ____9 2___IS 22 24 22.2 1 4.0
bomibing missions against a -forwvard concentration stratey seems to be lower than the
other txxo stratcgies in all four-plots. B-, applying the Wilcoxon signed rank test to the
data as in MIOE =l, it is found that the null hypotheses that the mecdians of the forward
conccntration and the balanced defense, rear area concentration for a largec small escort
attack on the FEBA rear area are equal as measured by the percentage of successful
bombing m-issions are rejected for each of the eight cases. Again, the forwarti conceni-
tration, emerges as a dominant strategy, as illustrated by the skyscraper plot of MOE '
in Figure 17 on page 33. When looking at the plot, keep in mnind that lower percentages
indicate a better strateev.
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Figure 16. Box Plots Showing MOE H2 Results for Soviet Attack on Rear Area
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C. MOE #3: NUMBER OF US GROUND-TARGETS DESTROYED
Table 3 -shows the simulation results for MOE #3. The box plots for the large and
small escort attacks on the rear area in terms of this MOE are presented in Figure 18
on page 35. As explained in Chapter 3, this MOE was only available in the rear area
attack scenarios.
Table 3. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MOE #3: Number of US Targets De-
stroyed
Type of Location of Escort Run Run Run Run Run Sample Sample
ADA Defense Air Attack Size #1 #2 #3 14 #5 Mean- Std. Dev.
Forwrd Large 33 35 31 38 40 35.4 3.6Concentration Rear Area - - - -
Small 19 12 5 14 19 13.8 5.8
Large 48 48 52 49 46 48.6 2.2
Defense Rear Area-
Small 27 27 26 19 23 24.4 3.4
Rear Area Large 56 52 51 34 42 47 8.9Conertrao Rear AreaI I :
Concentration Small 16 28 15 17 18.2 n.5
One of the suprising results from examining the box plots is that thd balanced de-
fcnse seems to do as well as the rear area concentration xNhcn it comes to protecting rear
area assets fiom damage. This could be because the balanced defense attrits some of the
planes along the FEBA as they ingress, some of them around the rear area assets, and
others along the FEBA as they are on their egress route. Due to the lightly defended
FEBA in the rear area concentration strategy, however, the airplanes can adjust their
route of attack so as to a% oid the air defenses ilong the FEBA. Consequently, the ADA
units Pre only allowed one chance to attrit the enemy; when they are attacking the rear
area targets.
The Wicoxon signed rank test is used to determine if the media" number of
ground-targets killed in the forward concentration is equal to the medians of the bal-
anced and rear area concentration for large and small escort attacks. The null hypoth-
eses are rejected in all but one case. When comparing the forward concentration to the
rear area concentration defense for a small escort attack, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected at the 0.10 significance level. Therefore, in that scenario it is a toss-up as to
34
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Figure 18. Box Plots S owing MOE #3 Results for Soviet Attack on Rear Area
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which defense-to employ. From the skyscraper plot (Figure 19 on page 36), it looks as
if -the height of the 'forward-smiall' skyscraper is signilicantly smaller than that of the
Irear-small' skyscraper. This could be true, since the Wilcoxon signed rank test-is a test
ofequality of medians, not means. The box plots in rigure 18 show the sample-medians
for-the two scenarios to-be much closer than-the sample means.
SKYSCRAPER PLOT OF MOE 13 SAMPLE MEANS
co
C
FUR WA4R RAR BLNE
US DE ENSE OPTIONS
Figure 19. Overall Comparison of Rear Area Attack Options i ith MOE #3 Results
D. MODEL EXCURSION
The dominance of the forward concentration defense in all three measures of effec-
tiveness was an unexpected- result. IIow could a forward concentration perform better
against a rear area attack than a rear area concentrated defense that was designed spe-
cifically for a rear area attack? As argued earlier, to attack a target in the rear area
which is defended b a rear area concentration, an airplane can slip through the ADA
co'.crage gaps in the FEBA and then-it needs only to survive the heavy coverage around
the target. In order to attack the same target defended by a forward concentration, an
airplane must survhe the trip through the heavy belt of ADA coverage on ingress, a
light coverage around the target, and another trip through the-fonvard belt on egress.
In order to further validate the results of the JTLS model and to-demonstrate that
the 'no gaps and heavy co'erage" design of the forward concentration defense strateg
36
is indeed the driving force behind its dominance as measured by the MOEs, two addi-
tional scenarios were constructed and run in the JTLS combat model. A new ADA de-
fense 'strategy,' called the reduced forwaid concentration, was constructed by retunoing
from-the model one out of every two adjacent ADA units in the forward concentration
defensive belt (see Appendix B for -details). This left the forward belt lightly defended
by ADA. The reduced forward concentration strategy was tested against two Soviet
options: a rear area attack with a large escort size, and a rear area attack with a small
escort size. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MODEL EXCURSION: Grouped by
MO Es
MOE I/I: Soviet Airplanes Shot Down By US ADA
Type of Location of Escort Run Run Run Run Run Sample Sample
AI)A Defense Air Attack Size //1 112 113 114 115 Mean Std. Dev.
Reduced Large 37 36 39 25 65 40.4 14.8
Forward Rear Area
Concentration Small 123 102 138 123 129 123 13.2
MOE 12: Percentage of Successful Soviet Bombing Missions
l'ype of Location of Escort Run Run Run Run Run Sample Samlle
ADA Defense Air Attack Size 111 112 13- /4 #5 Mean Std. Dev.
Reduced Large 76 89 79 90 67 80.2 9.6
Folrmaid Rear Area
Concentration Small 47 44 28 32 36 37.4 8.0
MOE 13: Numler of US Targets Destroyed
TIype of Location of Escort Run Run Run Run Run Sample Sample
ADA l)efense Air Attack Size 111 112 113 14 l5 Mean Std. Dev.
Reduced Large 61 61 58 61 53 58.8 3.5
Foriard Rear Area
Concentration Small 36 47 25 27 22 31.4 10.2
The reduced forward concentration defense was compared to the rear area concen-
tration defense for analysis. The resulting box plots i hich illustrate this comparison for
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each MOE are in Figure 20 on page 39, Figure 21 on page 40, and Figure 22 on page
41. The box plots indicate that rear area concentration performs better than the forward
reduced concentration in all cases except possibly for MOE I with a small escort size
attack. The Wilcoxon signed rank test confirms this indication: the null hypotheses are
rejected in faN or of the rear area concentration being the better performer in all but the
one case described above. This solidifies the theory that tile key to the success of the
forward concentration defense lies in its heavy concentration of no-gap ADA coverage.
E. SUMMARY
The data produced by running the twelve scenarios on the JTLS model were ana-
lyzed using graphical and nonparametric statistical methods. The resultb of the anal sis
shoix that almost without exception, the forward concentration ADA strategy performed
significantly better than the other defenses iith respect to every MOE. Also, no defense
performed significantly better than the forward concentration defense with respect to
an MOE. A model excursion was run that produced results supporting the supposition
that the ke% to the dominance of the forward concentration strateg3 is its dense cox erage
without gaps. Normally, a sensiti% ity analysis would be performed which would result
in different strategies being recommended for Narious scenarios, depending on-a subjec-
tive weighting of the MOEs. With a dominant strategy, however, no sensitivit3 analysis
is necessary; the forward concentration ADA strategy is the defense of choice for an3
scenario, independent of the weighting of the MOEs.
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STRATEGY COMPARISON FOR LARGE ESCORT ATTACK ON REAR AREA
REAR-AREA REDUCED FORWAV
C)NCENTRAT1ON CONCENTRATION




REAR AREA REDUCD FOXNAAV
CONCENTRATION CONCENTIlON
Figure 20. Box Plots Showing Model Excursion Results for MOE-f111
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REAR AREA REDUCED FORWA
CONCEN'TRAION CONCENTRATION
Figure 21. Box Plots Showing Mode! Excursion Results for MOE 112
4n
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REA R ARFA REDUCED FORWWt~O
CONCENTRATION CONCEW'/RAMtCN
Figure 22. Box Plots Showing Model Excursion Results for MOE 03
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if ADA units positioned in a belt defense
performed better than the point defense that the US Army currently uses. It sought to
do this through a comparison of three ADA defense strategies:
1. Forward Concentration (belt defense)
2. Balanced Concentration (point defense)
3. Rear Area Concentration (point defense)
The Joint Theater Level Simulation, a computer combat simulation model, was used as
a tool for analysis to compare the three strategies in a Fulda Gap scenario against a
variety of Soviet attack options. Using the following measures of effectiveness:
1. Soviet airplanes shot down by US ADA,
2. percentage of successful Soviet bombing missions, and
3. number of US ground-targets destroyed,
the forward concentration defense proN ed to have a significant advantage oN er the other
two strategies, regardless of the weighting of MOEs.
While it is acknowledged that a real-world comparison of these strategies could haN e
difTfirent results than this computer simulation, the total dominance of the forward
concentration defense strategy is too significant to ignore, even in-light of the limitations
placed on the scenario as discussed in "3. Scenario Limitations" on page 16. A com-
parison b computer simulation such as this is just one of the many steps involved in
developing new strategies to keep up with changing technologies.
JTLS proved to be a powerful analytical tool in the comparison of ADA strategies.
Its potential was barely tapped with the relatively small simulation used in this thesis.
With a large, analytical study run bN a dozen or more people, the ample analytical ca-
pabilities ofJTLS could be exercised. The planned improvements such as revision of the
postprocessor function and availability of detailed logistical information serve to in-
crease its attractiveness as an analytical tool.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this thesis are significant enough to warrant further study into the
comparative effectiv eness of the forward concentration defense strategy. Immediate
follow-on research should focus on expansion of scenarios to exploit JTLS capabilities.
If the results are still significant, future research should use different models, and- even-
tually field exercises-to validate- results already obtained. Specific reccomnendations for
immediate follow-on research are:
I. Repeat the strategy comparison using a classified database. Although the database
used for this thesis contained highly reasonable figures, they were not the actual
classified values.
2. Increase -the number of runs in- a cell to 20- or more, and attempt- to fit the data to
a distribution. This would aid the process of statistical analysis.
3. Incorporate US Air Force and logistics into the analy sis. Although this will greatly
complicate the scenario progranmming and data analysis eflbrts, both of these areas
are -needed in the model before it can be considered to have real-world-application.
4. Extend the war from one day to one week. This will show the effects of attrition
over a period of time on the different strategies. If logistics is played, any effects
of logistical shortfalls will surface.
I-inally. this thesis has demonstrated that JTLS is, indeed, suitable -for evaluating
tactics and doctrine in a variety of scenarios. In particular, use of the model to investi-
Cate various tacti.s in an en~ironment such as Desert Shield could provide valuable in-
sights to military planners.
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APPENDIX A. UNIT LOCATIONS AT BEGINNING OF SCENARIO
The following two lists contain the JTLS short name and -beginning- location- for the
units (except ADA units) involved in the combat model simulation.
A. US FORCES
UNIT NAM E LATITUDE LONGITUDE
CENTAG 49-25-58N 7-39-54E





I 4At) 50-48-00N 9-49-58E
2 4AD 50-56-59N 9-51-00E
3'4AD 50-53-59N 9-45-001:.
4 '43 FA 50-50-59N 9-43-5SE
H Q5AD 50-12-00N S-26-59E
1 '5AD 50-12-OON 8-26-59E




1 SID 50-25-01N 9-52-591
2"811 50-2S-01N 9-43-OOE
3 81D 50-37-0IN 9-43-OOE
4 562FA 50-34-00N 9-37-OOE
HQ-91D 50-19-59N 9-I- 00E
1 91D 50-19-59N 9-1 S-0OE
2 91D 50-19-59N 9-1S-00E
3 91D 50-19-59N 9-IS-00E
5 562FA 50-19-59N 9-1S-OE
HQ 2AI) 50-46-OON 9-13-00E
I. 2AD 50-43-59N 9-40-O1E
22AI) 50-48-44N 9-2S-39E
3' 2A D 50-43-00N 9-18-OOE
2-43FA 50-40-01N 9-36-OE
FIANKFURT 50-00-57N 8-32-29E
353AI0 50-00-57N 8-32-29E355 AlO50-00-57N S-32-9
71 'F14 50-00-57N 8-32-29E
567 F4 50-00-57N S-32-29E
, _A.MSTEIN 49-27-1SN 7-32-02E
I65TFW.F1 49-27-1SN 7-32-02r;
5521 E3A 49-27-1SN 7-32-02E
352 TKR 49-27-1SN 7-32-02)E
17 RF4 49-27-ISN 7-32-02E
2.FAR P 50-25-58N S-52-59E
IATK.IIELO 50-25-5SN 8-52-59E
2ATK.H ELO 50-25-58N 8-52-59E
I3ITBURG 50-23-59N 7-33-00E
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UNIT NAME LATITUDE LONGITUDE
I TFS'A 10 50-23-59N 7-33-O0E
991IFS A 10 50-23-59N 7-33-00E
2STFS:FI5 50-23-59N 7-33-OoE
27TFS' F15 50-23-59N 7-33-00E
HQ62AD 49-27-l SN 7-32-02E









101D 51-00-59N 10-57-57EI IOTI) 51-03-57N 1OI-41-5 JE
2 1KIM 50-56-59N 1 E-42-57U
3 1OTD 50-50-59N 10-55-5SE
2CAA 51-05-59N I 1-03-00E
14M RD 10-37-0WN I0-09-59E
1 14.IRI, 50-4-ilN Io-19-oOE
2 14MRR 50-32-59N 10-19-00E
3 14 MRR 0-37-00N 1(-09-59E
I4T]R i0-45-()()N 1o-30-00OE
12NIIRD 5 l-0-0,1N 1J-23-59lE
I 12MR I 5-":N I-II-59E2 I"R ... -4'-, .N 10 (19-573 12.M It 5R-42-514N I'-07L-
121TR 50-5 I-5N 1-IS i
DAG.14 50o-34-5SN 10-2)6--5,r
DAG.12 50-49-1N !1 -19 IFr
22TAA 5 1 -43-55N 1I !-N-4
7.FTR BIR 5I!3-5,,N I 1-56-50F
S.FlR 51-43-5N I I-56-:k
9.FTIR BM it 51-43-.S N II -5 EIo.MR II 1-43-5N 11-56-5,JE
57 LIFT 1 -43-5N I1-6-59E
WEIMAILAF3 4)-5S-29N I 1-19-5SE
I.FTR.AD 50-S-;s-2,N 1 !-19-58E2.FTP..AD 5( *)-5;8-29N I 1- 19- 5SE
LEIPZIG 512.1-O0N 12-26-59E
5.FTR BM R 51-24--0)N 12-26-59E6.BNI R 51-24-O4ON 12-26-5,'iWDAG.24 50-43-00N I 1-5-00iE
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APPENDIX B. LOCATIONS OF ADA UNITS
The following four lists contain the JTLS short name and location of tke ADA units
in each of the three ADA defense strategies, plus the excursion scenario.
A. BALANCED DEFENSE




21SUPCOM-H M 49-33N 7-47E
2ISUPCOM-MY., 49-27N 7-521
FRzANKFURIHIM 50-09N 8-441
FRANKFUIR-M M 50-02N 8-51 E
I-1Q'2A D-HM 50-46N 9-13E
I-IQ12AD-MvM 50-46N 9-13E
IlQAAD--M 50-50.N 9-29E
H Qz,4AD-M M 50-50N 9-29E
!-IQ5AD-H 3' 50-12N 8-271E
HQ '5AI)- -NN 50-12N 8-27E
I-I Q!S1D-HEM 50-35N 9-24E
-1 Q811)-M.M 50-35N 9-24K
II 91D--IM 50-20N 9-1 E
1 Q-.91D- M M 50-20N 9- I1
RAM.STEIN-I IM 49-37N 7-38E
IRAMSTE 1N-M M 49-37N 7-2SE
0005SAM-JAWS 50-3ON 7-44F
V.COSCOM-HM 50-17N 8-37E
V.COSCOM-M M\1 50-13N 8-52E
B. FORWARD CONCENTRATION DEFENSE
UNIT NAME LATITUDE LONGITUI)E
101SAM-HWK01 5 1-OON 9-35E
107SAM-HWK07 50-52N 9-35E
IIOSAM-1HWK 10 50-46N 9-33 E
21SUPCOM-HM 50-55N 9-36E
2lSUPCOM-M M 50-39N 9-31E
FR.NKFUR-HM 50-09N 8-44E
FPANKFUR-MM 50-33N 9-31E
HQ 2AD--IM 50-46N 9-13E





- IQ'811)-iM 50-35N 9-24E
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UNIT NAME LATITrUDE LONGITUDE
-IQSID-.MMN~ 50-35N 9-24E
I-IQ'q11)-IM% 50-27N 9-40E3
I-IQ 91D-MM]N~ 50-24N 9-46r;
R.AMSTEIN-I-I-M 49-' 7N 7-28E.
RAMNSIEIN-MMIN~ 50-20N 9-5413
OGOSAM-JAWS 50-' )N 7-44E3
V.COSCO.M-HM 50-12N 8-411:
v.COSCO-,;mM 50- 3 IN 9-23)L:
C. REAR AREA CONCENTRATION DEFENSE
UNIT NAMNE LATITUDE LONGITUDE
101 SAM\-IlWKOI 50-33N 7-'6E3
I07SA,'M-I-INVKO7 50-24N 7 -5 01E
IOSAM.\-HWKJO 50-24N 7-50E
21 SUPCONM--1 "v 49-33N 7-471E
21 SU ICO-MM~ 49-27N 7-52E3
FRANKFUR-HM\, 50-09N 8-441E
FRANKFUR-'MM .50-02N 8 -iFv
HQ 2AD-I-I.M 50-28N 7 -4 E
HQ1 2AD-.VM 50-46\ 9-1.1-;
H Q-4AD-1--I 50-21N 72 SE
1-1Q 4AD)-MMl\ 50-50ON 9 -291E,
HIQ'5AD-FIMN~ 50-i1ON 8-37E3
PIQ iA1)-MM 50-12N 8-2713
11Q81D-H*Im 49-24N 7-25'E
]-IQ 81D)-vMm 50-3iN 9-24r;
HlQ,"91)-HM~ 50-2bN 9-18111
11Q, 911- 49-36N 7-471
RA.MSTEIN-IIEM 49-37N 7-38E3
PAN'ISTEIN-.M.M 49-37N 7-281I-
0QOOSSA.\, -JA\VS 50-30N 7-41
V.COSCOM-HMl_.\l~ 50-17N 8 37E
V.COSCOM -NEMM 50-1 3N 8-52K
D. REDUCED FORWVARD CONCENTRATION DEFENSE
UNIT NA.ME LATITUDE LONGITUDE1
IO7SANM-1-IWKO7 50-52N 9-3 5E3
2 1SUPCO.M-.MM 50-39N 9 -31 E
FRANK FUR-1IM 50-09N S-414E
I-IQ,;2AD*-HM, 50-46N 9-13L
1-I Q'2,A )-:M N 50-46N 9-13E3
1-1Q, 4A D -1-1 50-50N 9-29E
H-Q'4AD-.MM 50-50ON 9-29E3
1-1IQ, 8S1D--1N 50-35N 9-241
1Q'S ID -MM5- 9-24EL






APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF-SOVIET AIR MISSIONS
The following two lists contain the composition, attack time, and targets for each
of the air attack missions. The terms in parentheses are the NATO names for the air-
planes used.
A. MAXIMUM ESCORT MISSIONS
MISSION NAME:
MAXI COMPOSITION: 15 Bombers (FITTER)
2 Jammers (BACKFIRE)
8 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
5 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0700-hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 2:4AD, HQ'4AD
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Franklurt
MAX2 COMPOSITION: 6 Bombers (BACKFIRE)
6 Bombers (FITTER)
2 Jammers (BACKFIRE)
8 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
5 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0730 hrs.
TARGETS. FEBA: I/4AD. I'2AD
TARGETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Ramstein
MAX3 COMPOSITiON: 15 Bombers (IITTER)
2 Jammers (BACKFIRE)
S Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
5 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0800 hrs.
TARGETS. FEBA: 2 SID, HQ1;SID
TARGETS, Rear: Ramstein, Bitburg
MAX4 COMPOSITION: 15 Bombers (FITTER)
2 Jammers (BACKFIRE)
8 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
5 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIM E: 1300 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 3!4AD, 2,14AD
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Frankfurt
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MAX5 COMPOSITION: 6 Bombers (BACKFIRE)
6 Bombers (FIT'TER)
2 Jammers (BACKFI RE)
8 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
5 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1330 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 2:4AD, 314AD
TARGETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Ramstein
MAX6 COMPOSITION: 15 Bombers (FITTER)
2 Jamners (BACKFIRE)
8 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
5 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1400 hrs.
TARGETS. FEBA: 381D, HQ/8ID
TARGETS, Rear: Ramstein, Frankfurt
B. MINIMUM ESCORT MISSIONS
MISSION NAME:
MINI COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FILOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0700 hrs.
TARGETS. FEBA: 2-AI), 3,4AD
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg. Frankfurt
MIN2 COMPOSITION: 3 Bombers (BACKFIRE)
I Bomber (FITTER)
1 Jammer (BACKFIREI)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
3 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0705 hrs.
TARGETS. FEBA: 2,2AD, I-IQAAD
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Ramstein
MIN3 COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
1 Jammer (BACK FI RE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0710 hrs.
TARGETS. FEBA: 2:4AD, 3!4AD
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Frankfurt
MIN4 COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
1 Janmer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0710 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 1,2AD, 2!43FA
TARGETS. Rear: Frankfurt, Ranistein
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MIN5 COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
3 Air-to-Air (-FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0800 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 2,43FA, 3/8iD
TARGETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Bitburg
M IN6 COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0830 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 3:SID, 2!43FA
TARGETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Ramstein




ATTACK TIME: 0900 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 2'8ID, HQISID
TARGETS, Rear: Ramstein, Bitburg
M INS COMPOSITION: 5 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
3 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 0930 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 2!SID, HQ'SD
TARGETS, Rear: Ramstein, Frankfurt
MIN9 COMPOSITION: 5 Bombers (FITTER)
1 Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGEIRS)
ATTACK TIME: 1000 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 4"562FA, 2,811D
TARGETS, Rear: Ramstein, Bitburg
MIN10 COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
1 Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1030 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: I'4AD, 4!43FA
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Frankfurt
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MINH COM POSITION: 3 Bombers (BACKFIRE)
1 Bombcr (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIR E)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
3 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1100 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 3:4AD, L'2AD
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Ramstein




ATTACK TIME: 1130 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 24AD; 4143FA
TARGETS, Rear: Bitburg, Frankfurt
MIN13 COMPOSITION: 5 B13ombers (FI TTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1200 hrs.
TARGETS, FEBA: I,2AD. I-IQ 4AD
TARGETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Ramstein
MINI4 COMPOSITION: 5 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFIRE)2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
3 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1230 hrs.
TA RGETS, FEBA: 2.43FA, HQ'8ID
TARGETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Bitburg
MINI5 COMPOSITION: 5 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jammer (BACKFI RE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1300 hrs.
TAZRGlETS. FEBA: I-IQ,'8ID, 2,4317A
TAPG ETS, Rear: Frankfurt, Ramstein





TARGETS, FEBA: 4,562FA, HQ181D
TARGETS, Rear: Ramstein, Bitburg
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NMINI7 COMIPOSITION: 4 B ombers (FITTE R)
~I Jai -mcr -(BACK F IRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
3 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1400 Jlirs.
TARGETS, FEBA: 41;43 FA, 1-1I-Q:A I
TARGETS, Rear: Rarnstcin,-frankfurt
MzIN 18 COMPOSITION: 4 Bombers (FITTER)
I Jarner-(BACKFIRE)
2 Wild Weasels (FLOGGERS)
2 Air-to-Air (FLOGGERS)
ATTACK TIME: 1430-lirs.
TARGETS, FEBA: -HQ,:2A1, 3,'2AD
TA RGETS, Rear: Ramstcin, Bitburg
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APPENDIX D. EXPLANATION OF BOX PLOTS
The symbols used in the box plots contained in this thesis and their corresponding
meanings are as follows:
v I'he top and bottom of the rectangle, or box, represent the upper and lower
quartiles of the data.
* The sample median is portrayed by a horizontal line segment within the rectangle.
* Solid lines extend from the top and bottom of the box to adjacent values, denoted
by x'. The upper adjacent value is the largest observatio., that is less than or equal
to the upper quartile plus (1.5 x interquartile range). Conversely, the lower adja-
cent value is the smallest observation that is greater than or equal to the lower
quartile minus (1.5 x interquartile range).
* Any observation that falls outside the range of the two adjacent values is called an
outside value, and is plotted individually as a '+'.
* Dashed lines are used to connect the sample mean, denoted b- '', of one sample
to another. [Ref. 8: p. 21
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APPENDIX E. WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST RESULTS
This appendix contains details of the Wilcoxon signed rank test procedures as they
are applied to the h3pothesis testing in Chapter IV,. In each case, the null hypothesis is
that the sample medians are the same. The symbol '>' in the alternate hypothesis is
used to indicate that the median of the first scenario is greater than the median of the
second. The short names used to indicate scenarios are:
* FC = forward concentration
* BA = balanced
• RC = rear area concentration
* RF = reduced forward concentration
o LG = largc escort
" SM = small escort
" FB = FEBA attack
" .A = rear area attack
The numbers in the signed rank colunm are the magnitudes (in ranked order with sign
attached) of the differences in the observations from each run of the corresponding sce-
narios. The Wilcoxon signed rank test statistic (T..) is the sum of the ranks with nega-
tive siens. The midrank method is used to assign ranks for ties. For a sample size of five
and an a = 0.10. the null hypothesis is rejected when T- < 3. For a sample size of four
(used in one case because of a zero value data point), the critical value is 1.
A. MOE f I
ALTERNATE NULL HYPOTHESIS
HYPOTHESIS SIGNED RANK T REJECTED?
FB-LG-FC > FB-LG-BA 4 6 7 7 15 0 YES
FB-LG-FC > FB-LG-RC 6 8 8 9 16 0 YES
FB-SM-FC > FB-SM-BA 35 42 44 45 47 0 YES
FB-SM-FC > FB-SM-RC 37 45 46 46 51 0 YES
ILA-LG-FC > IRA-LG-BA 21 29 35 38 60 0 YES
IL-LG-FC > RA-LG-RC 31 35 38 47 64 0 YES
RA-S.M-FC > RA-SM-BA 14 15 17 27 34 0 YES
RA-SM-FC > RA-SM-RC 17 18 IS 22 34 0 YES
IRA-LG-RC > R.A-LG-RF 9 19 22 24 41 0 YES




HYPOTHESIS SIGNED RANK T- REJECTED?
FB-LG-FC > FB-LG-BA 1 1 4 4 8 0 YES
FB-LG-FC > FB-LG-RC 1 1 4 5 8 0 YES
FB-SM-FC > FB-SM-BA 11 12 14 19 22 0 YES
FB-SM-FC > FB-SM-RC 13 15 15 19 22 0 YES
L,k-LG-FC > RA-LG-BA 
-2 5 13 14 27 1 YES
RA-LG-FC > RA-LG-RC 11 13 15 26 28 0 YES
RA-SM-FC > PA-SM-BA 8 14 15 16 18 0 YES
RA-SM-FC > RA-SM-RC 0 4 6 8 11 0 YES
RA-LG-RC > RA-LG-RF 7 10 18 25 36 0 YES
RA-SM-RC > IPA-SM-RF 10 10 12 16 28 0 YES
C. MOE 113
ALTERNATE NULL HYPOTHESIS
HYPOTHESIS SIGNED RANK T_ REJECTED?
RA-LG-FC > RA-LG-BA 6 11 13 15 21 0 YES
RA-IG-FC > IPA-LG-RC 2 -4 17 20 23 2 YES
IRA-S...I-FC > RA-SM-BA 4 5 8 15 21 0 YES
RA-S,.I-FC > IA-S..I-RC 1 -2 -3 10 16 5 NO
RA-LG-RC > RA-LG-RF 5 7 9 11 27 0 YES
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